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IN BEHALF OF A UNIFIED STATE BAR
By BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN, of the Denver Bar
AR integration, like many other recently coined terms,
is but a new name for an old principle applied to pres-
ent conditions. Our first colonial bar associations com-
prised what would today be termed an integrated bar. They
were organized along the lines of the self-governing English
Incorporated Law Society, and provided the sole regulation
of the practice of law. The first such association seems to
have been organized in New York in 1747. The Revolution
and the impatience with restraint and authority which fol-
lowed swept away all restrictions upon the right to practice
law; for a time any citizen could appear and argue another's
cause, and bar associations completely disappeared. This free
and easy condition was of short duration; it speedily became
intolerable, and the public interest forced the return of regu-
lation. Regulation gradually increased with the better organi-
zation of state government, but bar associations did not re-
appear until about 1870, when a few lawyers again organized
in New York to correct conditions felt to be grossly unethical.
Since then the right to practice law, which more than any
other calling affects the rights and property of the public, has
been subjected to increasing regulation, and bar associations
have developed correspondingly.' The movement towards in-
tegration began shortly after the close of the World War, and
has gained great impetus in the past six or seven years. Today
bar integration acts are in effect in the states of Washington,
Oregon, California, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona; New
Mexico-practically all of the far western states-and in
North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Alabama, Michigan, Kentucky, and North Carolina as
well. The movement is also under consideration in fourteen
other, jurisdictions, including Colorado.2
The need for a stronger organization of the bar has been
presented to the lawyers of Denver before; Denver may, in
'Charles E. Lane, Bar Integration, Annual Proceedings of the Wyoming State
Bar Association 1930-1934, page 28.
'Mr. Fred R. Wright of the Denver Bar; 19 Journal American Judicature
Society 77, October, 1935.
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fact, be said to have been a pioneer in this field. In 1920, in
one of the earliest presentations ever made of this subject, Mr.
Charles H. Haines of Denver read before the Denver" Bar As-
sociation a paper advocating organization of the bar along the
lines of the medical association. Submitted to a vote, the pro-
posal was defeated by a small margin. In the next year South
Dakota became the first state to adopt a unified state bar act,
and from that time forward the movement has spread, prin-
cipally in the west, becoming known as the bar integration
movement. In May, 1934, it was revived in Colorado by
Dean James Grafton Rogers at a meeting of lawyers at the
University of Colorado, and in September, 1934, was
brought before the Colorado Bar Association by Mr. G. Dex-
ter Blount. The Colorado Bar Association determined to
obtain the sentiment of the local associations before taking
action, and to that end a resolution favoring bar integration
was introduced at the October, 1935, meeting of the Denver
Bar Association. This resolution is still under consideration,
and to it this article is addressed.
Although the better and more complete organization of
the bar has come to be referred to as "bar integration." this
phrase suffers somewhat in that its unfamiliar and scientific
terminology gives it a wholly unwarranted appearance of kin-
ship to some new and controversial ideas of government. The
word integration suggests nothing familiar to most lawyers,
who passed calculus by on the other side, and this unfamil-
iarity makes the always cautious lawyer hesitate. It would
therefore be well to find out exactly what the phrase "bar
integration" means.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines "inte-
grate" as "to unify (parts or elements) so as to form a whole;
as to integrate local governments into a general government;"
and "integration" as the "formation of a whole from con-
stituent parts." It follows therefore, that bar integration
means simply the formation into one single united organi-
zation of all the elements-individual lawyers and local and
state bar associations-which now comprise the bar of this
state. The term "bar integration," thus viewed, is seen to
designate a simple, natural, and logical development. As
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adopted in practice it will be found to introduce no elements
new to our present organization except unity, universal mem-
bership, and adequate finances.
Let us now consider briefly the present organization of
the Colorado Bar so that we may compare what we now have
with what is proposed, and see whether our present organiza-
tion is to be radically departed from. Although no living per-
son can definitely state the names, number, and location of the
lawyers now licensed and practicing in Colorado, the office of
the Clerk of the Supreme Court estimates that there are ap-
proximately 1,800 lawyers practicing in this state, of whom
1,100 are located in Denver. The only organization designed
to represent all these lawyers is the Colorado Bar Association
with a membership of but about 600, approximately one-
half of whom have fully paid all dues, including those now
current. There are fourteen local bar associations, thirteen
outside of Denver, with a total membership of about 400,
and the Denver Bar Association, the largest, with about 600
members. About one-third of the lawyers thus belong to the
Colorado Bar Association, and about fifty-five per cent to local
associations. By its rule 84A, the Colorado Supreme Court
has made the Colorado Bar Association an official arm of the
court and has authorized it to institute proceedings in disci-
pline. Pursuant to this authority, the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion, first through its Secretary and then through its Com-
mittee on Grievances, hears and acts upon almost all charges
of professional misconduct.' It has also long been the prac-
tice of the Supreme Court to confer with and consult officers
of the Colorado Bar Association in connection with admis-
sions and the appointment of its examining committees. Some
of the county bar associations, including the Denver Bar As-
sociation, have committees on grievances, although, aside from
bringing about numerous settlements, they take no action be-
yond making recommendations to the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion. We therefore already have in Colorado a system under
which the bar, at all times subject to the authority of the
Court, disciplines itself and influences admissions.
'For a complete statement of the procedure in disciplinary matters, see address
of Harrie M-. Humphreys as President of the Colorado Bar Association, September,
1931. 34 Colorado Bar Association, 145, 152.
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Now let us see what an integrated bar would include.
It has been possible in preparing this article to examine inte-
gration acts and investigate their working in but three of the
jurisdictions which have adopted this plan, Washington, Ore-
gon, and California. These jurisdictions are apparently repre-
sentative and were only selected because confidential inquiry
could be there made of friends, some of them former Colo-
rado lawyers, whose opinions, because their interest or former
residence here, might have special value. Of these states, Cali-
fornia first integrated its bar on July 29, 1927, under an act
which, with its amendments and the rules and regulations
adopted pursuant thereto, comprises the most elaborate and
carefully worked out of the three systems. Washington
adopted an exceedingly simple integration act on March 13,
1933,4 and Oregon followed with a more comprehensive en-
actment on February 14, 1935. The three-acts vary in detail,
but all include or recognize what may perhaps be said to com-
prise the fundamental essentials of bar integration, namely:
1. Only members of the organized state bar can prac-
tice law.
2. Elective officers or committees of the organized state
bar are in charge of admission, subject to the supervision of
the Supreme Court.
3. Membership in the organized state bar can be main-
tained only by the payment of an annual fee, which for active
members is $7.50 in California, $5 in Washington, and $3
in Oregon.
4. The organized state bar is governed by officers
elected by its membership, who serve without compensation.
5. Elective officers or committees of the organized
state bar hear and determine all matters of discipline and make
recommendations to the Supreme Court for any necessary
action.
6. An annual meeting is provided for and held.
7. A monthly publication concerning bar activities,
much similar to our own "Dicta," is published.
8. Local bar associations are not interfered with.
'The Washington State Bar Act (Ch. 94, Washington Session Laws of 1933)
includes but 15 short sections and covers but three and one-half small pages. Its
extreme simplicity recommends it as a legislative model.
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If all attorneys now practicing in Colorado should be
united in one self-governing state-wide bar association; if all
these members should pay a reasonable annual fee; if this
association should publish a magazine similar to "Dicta" for
the entire 1,800 members of the state bar; if disciplinary mat-
ters should be administered through the proper committees of
this united organization; if the tacit influence now exercised
by the bar over admissions should receive formal recognition;
if such organizations as the Denver Bar Association, the Law
Club, and the local bar associations should continue to func-
tion; and if all these things were done by proper legislative or
judicial authority, we should have an integrated bar in Colo-
rado. The prospect is, after all, a long way from appalling.
But it may be asked why such a move is necessary. One
answer is that the bar is hard beset on every hand and must
improve its organization if it is to hold its ground. Collec-
tion agencies, trust companies and banks are offering com-
petition in fields once regarded as the special province of the
bar, but they are not the only bugaboo of the lawyer. Both
national and state governments have organized and will con-
tinue to organize agencies to compete with lawyers; the State
Labor Commissioner and the administration of the Work-
man's Compensation Act are but two illustrations from our
own jurisdiction. Laws have recently been passed and will
probably continue to be passed which, in effect, almost
prevent lawyers from appearing in certain classes of contro-
versies. Public opinion is at present unfavorable to and
impatient with our legal system; the hounds of the press have
taken up the pursuit of unethical practitioners and are in full
cry; J. Edgar Hoover and the G-Men are-swiftly closing in on
the criminal fringe. The situation simply cannot be ignored.
Such part of this criticism as is true must be answered by cor-
rection and reform, and the remainder must be replied to and
refuted. No one individual could meet and withstand this
avalahche. That can be done only through a strong organi-
zation built up upon such democratic lines as will afford ade-
quate defense without the destruction of our fundamental
concepts of individual self-government. Lawyers have always
been afraid of organization. Their work requires individual
thinking, and this makes them fundamental individualists;
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but whether they like it or not, they live in an age of organi-
zation, and conditions have now reached the point where they
must now organize or find their functions taken over by peo-
ple who will.
The defects in the administration of law, its delay and
inconsistencies and its procedural deficiencies, while in a large
degree the fault of laymen, are charged by public opinion to
the, bar, and can only be corrected by a degree of thought and
continuity of purpose on the part of the profession impossible
for scattered and poorly organized groups or individuals. On
public legal questions in which the opinion of the bar is of
value there must be some agency to obtain the consensus of
the bar and to speak with authority on its behalf. One of
the severest critics of bar integration demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of bar organization when his committee put an end
to the increase in abstract costs by the National Recovery Ad-
ministration.5 Mr. Harry N. Haynes of Greeley recognized the
need of action by the bar when at the 1934 meeting of the
Colorado Bar Association he addressed that gathering upon
the need for a new or revised constitution for Colorado.
With any effective bar organization must go financial
strength. The present revenue of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion is said to be about $3,500 per year, a pathetic figure if
one considers the work that must be done. The combined
lawyers in this state have been able to amass an old age relief
fund for their needy brethren of $879.11, a striking illustra-
tion of the weakness of voluntary organization. When this
financial condition is contrasted with that of the State Bar of
California, which enjoys an annual revenue of $105,000, it
will be seen why the integrated bar can boast of greater
accomplishments.
There has been much keen and penetrating criticism of
the proposal for an integrated bar, of which the all-time high-
water mark was certainly reached when Mr. Vogl called it an
attempt to substitute "Boetian mediocrity for scintillating
omnilucence." ' Chief Justice Hughes once said that "The first
"Albert L. Vogl, Chairman, Report of Special Committee on Costs of Abstracts
of Title. September, 1934: 36-37 Colorado Bar Association 170.
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thought in the mind of any well prepared lawyer is 'I object',"
and this inherent tendency to object to and analyze any new
proposal may be responsible for much of the criticism. Many
of the objections, moreover, consists in attacks upon straw
men which the critics have themselves created, and are directed
at evils which have no existence save in their shimmering im-
aginations. It is attacked most seriously and with great feel-
ing by a leading opponent as a bureaucratic imposition and
just one more newfangled scheme to smother democracy; yet it
is certainly not imposed by anyone, for it is the plan of the
lawyers themselves, and it is just as certainly a step in the
direction of democratic self-government. Without in any way
criticising the Colorado Bar Association, it is hardly reason-
able to contend that the functions which it performs with a
membership of one-third of all the lawyers acting under their
own by-laws, are essentially more democratic than the func-
tions of a state bar which would include all lawyers acting
under public law. Some natural concern is also expressed as
to whether bar integration will destroy our present voluntary
bar associations. Local associations flourish elsewhere under
integrated bar acts, and from the viewpoint of many lawyers
would be considerably improved if they should become purely
social organizations. Of all the bar association meetings ever
held, none could be as delightful as the meetings of the Bar
Association of the First Judicial District, where every form
of serious legal matter is banished and where the members
spend a pleasant evening in the display of wit and friendship,
in enjoying the reminiscences of the older members, and in
renewing acquaintances.
It is not, however, necessary to rely upon dogmatic con-
clusions or opinions to determine whether or not bar integra-
tion is advisable. There is a wealth of experience in jurisdic-
tions in no way dissimilar to ours from which empirical con-
clusions may be safely made.
In October, 1935, in the belief that bar integration
should be defeated and that lawyers would, in states where
the tyranny had been imposed, gladly help to check its
growth, letters were addressed to four acquaintances in the
three coast states requesting their confidential opinions on bar
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integration.7 It was a distinct surprise to receive answers all
uniformly and strongly in favor of this plan. There was no
dissenting vote, and this, under the circumstances, may be
some evidence that bar integration meets with approval. At
about the same time, in answer to further inquiries, letters
were received from the president of the state bar in Washing-
ton, Oregon, and California, all indicating that the plan was
a success in their states; and while it may be argued that these
opinions are biased, the facts which they set forth may be
safely quoted and relied upon.
Mr. Norman A. Bailie of San Francisco, a member of the
Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, and one
of its past presidents says that
"The last California Legislature appointed a Committee to in-
vestigate The State Bar and a very thorough hearing was had and prac-
tically all of the developments were in favor of The State Bar. In
connection with the said investigation a plebiscite of the members of
the state bar was had on the question: Do you favor the repeal of the
State Bar? The vote was almost three to one against repeal, which
indicates that the greater portion of California lawyers do not desire to
return to the old voluntary system."
Mr. Robert F. Maguire of Portland, President of the
Oregon State Bar, says that
"The first meeting of the new Bar was held in Salem on Septem-
ber 27th and 28th and over 500 lawyers attended, which is consider-
ably more than 25% of the total number of lawyers practicing in Ore-
gon. When it is realized that many of these lawyers had to travel three
or four hundred miles in order to attend the meeting and that it was
held in Salem, some sixty miles from Portland, the attendance was very
gratifying."
Mr. L. R. Hamblin of Spokane, President of the Wash-
ington State Bar Association, says that
"We have been operating under our integrated act now since 1933
and I am confident that if you would ask any lawyer in the state con-
cerning same his answer would be most favorable."
'These lawyers were Mr. Harry L. Moller, 1618 N. Las Palmas Avenue, Holly-
wood, California; formerly of Delta, Colorado. Mr. Abraham Asher, 701 Corbett
Building, Portland, Oregon. Mr. Victor A. Montgomery, 1400 Alaska Building.
Seattle; formerly of Boulder, Colorado. Mr. Louis Shela, 808 Lowman Building.
Seattle, Washington.
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It is therefore a fair conclusion that whatever objections
may be made to integration, the plan nevertheless meets with
approval from the bar, which is in some respects a more con-
vincing argument than any amount of theorizing.
Opinions may differ in degree but cannot differ in con-
clusion as to the benefits to be derived from bar integration.
Such opposition as has arisen in other states has not come
from lawyers, but from other elements, and its basis is not
the inefficiency of these associations. It is officially asserted"
that a comparison of 77 years under voluntary associations
in California with seven years under an integrated bar shows
an increase in actions taken against attorneys for unprofes-
sional conduct of 6,000 per cent. In other words, the house-
cleaning so insistently demanded by the public has gone for-
ward 60 times as fast under an integrated bar as it did under
voluntary organization. The lawyers in the other states here-
tofore referred to assert positively that unfair competition
from non-legal agencies has been practically abolished by bar
integration. This indicates that something positive has been
added by the new form of organization.
To believe in bar integration it is not necessary to be-
lieve that the bar is corrupt, and to be ready to join the lynch-
ing party now pursuing the lawyers as part of the national
frenzy against crime; we know the bar is not corrupt. Neither
is belief in bar integration dependent upon opposition to
banks and trust companies, or upon other special phobias,
justified or otherwise. To believe in bar integration it is
simply necessary to believe that the public duties now en-
trusted to scattered and incompletely organized groups of
lawyers can be performed to better advantage by a complete
organization of the entire bar of the state. If one can lend
assent to that single proposition, it follows that he must
favor an integrated bar.
8California State Bar Journal 303: December, 1935.
SOME PIONEER LITIGATION
By HENRY B. BABB, of the Denver Bar.
IVE a dog a bad name," and the implication is, it will
be augmented by accretions for which he is in no way
responsible. The "Robber Seventh" General Assembly
seems to bear the odium of the contemporary chaotic condi-
tion of the state's finances. As will later appear, such condi-
tion already existed when that body first met, and what it
did was to aggravate bad conditions. There were warrants
unpaid and uncollectible that had been issued to former Gov-
ernor Alva Adams for his official salary; like warrants that
had been issued to J. C. Helm and other members of the Su-
preme Court; such warrants aggregating hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars par value had been issued in payment of legiti-
mate demands sold by the immediate payees and held by inno-
cent purchasers. It is useless to say that the state's credit
was nil.
In the confusion of demands for payment, censure of
newspapers and grave official responsibility, the Auditor and
Treasurer of the administration beginning in 1891 and next
following that of the Seventh General Assembly, did not
know what to do and the mess was put up to the Legal De-
partment of the State Government. There were no precedents
whatever. An erudite case lawyer might have found himself
in the situation of Mark Twain's invincible bulldog. That
warrior's ever-effective method of combat was to clench his
enemy's hind leg between his jaws and hold on until any de-
gree of canine fortitude would succumb. Yet this hero of a
hundred battles was finally whipped out of his skin by a dog
that had lost both hind legs in a sawmill. From which it may
be inferred that an unsophisticated rustic mentality, that knew
no resource but to face the constitution and statute law, was
the better instrument for dissecting the difficulty. Accordingly,
uniformly successful defenses of suits brought against the
Auditor, following the opinion given, gave judicial sanction
to the policies then adopted and since followed by the fiscal
officers of the state and they have pursued the even tenor of
their way with little or no controversy. This is not saying
that excess warrants have not at times been issued-warrants,
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that after issue, proved to be automatically invalid by reason
of the inadequacy of funds in the specific appropriations from
which they were to be paid, and inaccurate previous official
guesses as to such adequacy.
In the administration preceding the Seventh Assembly,
one Peter Breene had been elected State Treasurer. His quali-
fications for office were his genial disposition and he had struck
it rich in Leadville. He had built a rather pretentious house.
A number of friends were calling and one said, "Pete, you
ought to have a chandelier for this room." He demurred, but
when it was the unanimous judgment of the company that
it ought to be, he yielded and said to his secretary, "Go down-
town in the morning and have a chandelier sent out," but
added to his friends, "Now, I don't believe there is one of you
can play the damn thing when it comes." Another less famil-
iar story of his arrival in Denver, more aptly illustrating the
man, might be told but the well known implacable asceticism
of the bar forbids.
Prior to Breene's administration there had been rumors
of speculation in theTreasurer's office, which reached high
tide during his term.
At the 1890 November election, James N. Carlisle had
been elected State Treasurer. The Eighth General Assembly
made an effort to correct existing disorders by passing a law
increasing the Treasurer's bond to $500,000 and his salary to
$5,000. The Colorado constitution forbids such increase of
salary during the officer's term of office. To avoid the pro-
hibition the bill was rushed through both houses and signed
by the outgoing Governor before the officers-elect were sworn
in. Carlisle filed his increased bond and at the end of the first
month demanded his increased salary. The courts sustained
the refusal to pay the increase.
The Eighth General Assembly, by joint resolution, en-
gaged a printing firm to print the State Engineer's report,
which, in addition to the usual statistical and historical mat-
ter, would include complete maps of each and all the irriga-
tion districts in the state, and the resolution provided an
appropriation of $7,500 as compensation for the service. The
work was acceptably done by the printers and they demanded
the promised payment. No. Why not? Congress might, by a
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joint resolution, make a valid contract of the kind and ap-
propriate money for payment. The Colorado constitution
says that no law shall be passed except by bill, and prescribes
the formula, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the
State of Colorado." The courts sustained the Auditor's re-
fusal to pay. The account was afterwards paid by valid
appropriation.
A man was deserted by his wife. He shot her lover
down in her presence and was indicted for murder in the first
degree. He was brought to trial and the woman was called
to testify for the prosecution. Upon his objection, to his com-
plete surprise a decree of divorce was submitted in evidence.
Her testimony was admitted. He was convicted of murder
in the first degree and sentneced to be hanged. He appealed
the case to the Supreme Court and brought suit to vacate the
decree of divorce on the ground that he had never been served
with summons. The trial court vacated the decree and the
woman appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, where the
order of vacation was promptly affirmed. The man was
guilty. Why not let him hang? Contra: Could it be per-
mitted that the administration of justice might be so prosti-
tuted that the basic safeguard of life and liberty of the citizen
might be flouted or ignored, even to punish the guilty? If
not, what could be done? The record in the Supreme Court
was watertight and airtight. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court suggested a way out. It was that that court,
in a case before it, would take notice of the action of its affili-
ate court upon an issue so vital to the cause of justice, and so
The People confessed error. Retrial resulted in a life sentence.
The case of The People against J. Thatcher Graves at-
tracted nation-wide attention. Major steps in the trial court
and in the Supreme Court were subjects of press notice and
comment throughout the United States. Mistress Barnaby, a
wealthy New England woman, was visiting friends in Den-
ver. She received a package through the mails, endorsed,
"From your friends in the woods." It was a bottle of whiskey.
She drank part of its contents and speedily died of arsenical
poison. Suspicion fastened on her family physician and he
was indicted by a Denver grand jury, charging murder in
the first degree. He was advised by his eastern lawyer to sur-
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render himself and stand trial. If personal security was the
consideration, it was and is impossible to understand why
such advice was given, for he could not have been extradited.
The Supreme Court of the United States in like cases has
since so decided the question more than once. The pertinent
language of the Federal Constitution is:
"If any person charged in any state with treason, felony or other
crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state," etc.
It was stated that he came very reluctantly, taking some
three weeks from starting to reach his destination. Upon his
arrival in Denver he was locked up and in due time tried, con-
victed of murder in the first degree and sentenced to be hanged.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court the case was reversed,
chiefly for error in instructing the jury. The writer had oc-
casion to see him in the penitentiary while his case was pend-
ing in the Supreme Court. He was apparently full six feet
high, erect, and of generous physical proportions without
pudginess-a rather impressive figure at some distance. Upon
close approach, his rather large nose was flattened as much as
could be on the left cheek; his eyes were pale blue, presenting,
possibly, to a prejudiced observed a sinister physiognomy; to
an impartial observer, a more or less disappointment of first
impression. In the brief conversation, he said that it would
seem very strange that a scientific man would resort to such
a crude method of homicide when he could accomplish the
result in a manner that would not even suggest suspicion. On
reversal of his case he was, of course, remanded to the Denver
jail. One sunny summer Sunday afternoon the newsboys
began shouting, "Suicide of Doctor Graves. Read all about
it." In two letters to his wife, he discussed the step he was
taking. In one of them he said, "I could not have been so
bad a man to have had the love of so good a woman." A
highly significant fact was that a careful autopsy failed to dis-
cover the cause of his death. His vital organs were all in a
perfectly healthy condition. Was self-vindication his pur-
pose, or part of it? If so, so far as known, only one person
ever thought of one death in connection with the other.
The foregoing cases are mentioned because each in its
own way is believed to be of special interest. Other cases of
minor interest and cases involving large monetary values, as
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the Coal Land cases, were cases for which the same administra-
tion was responsible.
The state had reached a stage of maturity at which it
concluded to assert its inherent dignity of statehood, when
its officials must obey its laws and when fashionable schemes
for plundering its resources must be frustrated.
Note: What was done with the unpaid warrants? This
question is not within the purview of the above caption, but
the young lawyer and the lawyer who has forgotten will
probably like to know its answer. The Eleventh General As-
sembly submitted an amendment to the state constitution
which provided for the issue of not exceeding $2,115,000
three per cent refunding bonds. The preamble of the bill re-
cited that, "Whereas, a major portion of the above indebted-
ness is held in the State School Fund as an investment, which,
under the constitution of the State, must forever remain in-
violate and intact, any loss thereof to be supplied by the
State," etc. The bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator
Frank E. Gove and put over in the House by majority leader
Henry A. Hicks. Being submitted, the teachers of the state
went at it tooth and nail and secured its adoption by the
people. The credit of the state was redeemed and financial
infamy was effaced.
EDITOR "DICTA:"
I want to thank the participants and the splendid audi-
ence for their response at the "Major Bowes" lawyers' ama-
teur hour and stag smoker on the evening of November 12th
at the Denver Athletic Club. Such affairs as this are directly
successful in proportion to the response and spirit of the audi-
ence and those participating, and I feel that I would be remiss
if I did not say that I never saw a more responsive and happy
audience over which I have had the pleasure of presiding than
the members of the bar on this occasion.
I also want to thank the officers of the Denver Bar As-
sociation, particularly "Bob" More, its President, and
"Jimmie" Wood, its Secretary, for their untiring help and
support in having the tickets distributed and in arousing in-
terest in the smoker, also for the fine co-operation of my
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entire Banquet Committee, and particularly my very able
stage manager, Joe Lilly, who also won the Dunklee cup as
the best amateur of the evening, with his magnificent singing.
The writer is only sorry that there was not a prize for each
of those who appeared on the program, particularly for Gar-
wood and Blackman, in their duet, Frank Grant for his
musical number, Roy 0. Samson and Elson Whitney for
their singing, Fred Harding, pianologist, Sam Parlapiano and
his flute, George Crowder, monologist, Harold Spitzer, im-
personator, and Frank Fetzer for his act, which, however, he
seemed loath to bring to an end, and particularly I wish to
thank the Judges, from the Supreme Court down to the Jus-
tices of the Peace, for their co-operation in being the star
amateurs of the evening, which event was won by Judge
Henry Lindsley.
As stated in the cards advertising the meeting, the sole
purpose was that of fellowship and friendship between the
Bench and Bar, and I believe it is not too much to say that a
long step was taken in this direction, for which the writer is
duly appreciative.
Nor would this note of thanks be complete if I did not
give a word of appreciation for the splendid co-operation of
the Denver Athletic Club, whose guests we were that night,
and also to the out-of-town guests, particularly the splendid
group from Colorado Springs, with their "Senator Fishface,"
and Senator Alva Adams and his group from Pueblo, and
his amateur, Sam Parlapiano, the former President of the
Pueblo Bar Association.
Finally, you who attended made this affair whatever
success it achieved, for which "Major Bowes" thanks you.
"All right, all right."
EDWARD V. DUNKLEE,
Chairman Banquet Committee.
P. S.-Your Chairman is calling a meeting of the Banquet Com-
mittee to plan for the best Annual Banquet the Bar Association has ever
had, as soon as Prexy "Bob" More returns from California. It is the
committee's desire to have one address by some outstanding speaker of
note, and to have the dinner excellent and the program short and
snappy. Announcements of this event will be made later. E. V. D.
CORPORATIONS-APPEARANCE IN JUSTICE COURT WITHOUT AN
ATTORNEY-United Securities Corporation vs. Pantex Pressing
Machine, Inc., a Corporation, Intervenor, and Byram-No. 13714
-Decided November 25, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error garnished City of Denver to recover
property taken from one H. F. Byram for taxes. Defendant intervened
under an unrecorded mortgage. Plaintiff was represented in Justice of
the Peace Court by a collection agent, who was not a licensed attorney.
Justice of the Peace Court entered judgment by default for intervenor, as
plaintiff not represented by licensed attorney. County Court refused
appeal on same grounds; the plaintiff company was represented there
by a licensed attorney.
HELD: C. L. 21, Sec. 6091, provides that a creditor himself may
prosecute action in Justice of the Peace Court. Sec. 6093 provides for
bond, which was duly filed in this case. Sec. 6056 provides that plain-
tiff may appear by agent to prevent default. Sec. 6071 provides for ap-
peals to County Court trial. Sec. 5997 provides for license to practice
in court of record. Sec. 6017 provides punishment for attempt to prac-
tice in court of record without license. Sec. 1, Art. IV, Colorado Con-
stitution, provides Supreme, District and City Courts, and such others
as may be provided by law. Justice of the Peace Court established by
legislative act is not court of record and legislative enactments allow
practice before such courts without license as attorney. Plaintiff corpo-
ration complied with statutes in entirety. Agent had right to prosecute
case in question in Justice of Peace Court.
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY AS BAILEE AND EMBEZZLEMENT-CRIM-
INAL RESPONSIBILTY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS-INSTRUCTIONS
AND VERDICT-Blackett vs. The People-No. 13550-Decided
November 25, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Defendant and others were charged with larceny as bailees and
with embezzlement. Defendant was the dummy president of a broker-
age company. A sum of money was paid to the company by complain-
ing witness under a trading agreement. This money was converted,
but the evidence failed to show that defendant either received, traded
with or misappropriated the money. His connection with the company
in reality was that of employee only. He was found guilty on both
counts.
1. The proof was insufficient to sustain a conviction under either
count.
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2. Evidence of dissimilar transactions was improperly admitted,
since neither a bailment nor an embezzlement was proved and defendant
was not charged as a conspirator.
3. The giving of an instruction that an officer of a corporation,
through whose acts the corporation commits an offense, is guilty of the
same offense, was erroneous since there was no proof of any acts com-
mitted by the officer.
4. The giving of an instruction charging a corporate officer with
such knowledge of its affairs as could be ascertained by the exercise of
due diligence was erroneous as not supported by the evidence and as
inapplicable to a criminal proceeding.
5. Larceny as bailee and embezzlement may be properly joined
in the same information, provided on trial the evidence is limited to one
transaction.
The motion to require the prosecution to elect should have been
granted.
Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck
specially concurring.
Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Young dissenting.
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY AS BAILEE AND EMBEZZLEMENT-West
vs. The People of the State of Colorado-No. 13549-Decided
November 25, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland..
Judgment reversed. See Blackett vs. People, 97 Colo. -, also
decided same day. Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Young dissenting.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANT NOT AGENT OF LANDLORD-
CONTRACTS-Denver Tramway Corporation vs. Rumry-No.
13627-Decided November 25, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Suit for breach of a contract concerning a diversion dam across
Bear Creek. Plaintiff recovered for crop damage resulting from flood.
The predecessor of defendant and others had built a dam on the site of
the one now in question. Plaintiff subsequently released the builders
thereof from liability for flood and granted the privilege to maintain
the dam up to a certain height. Defendant then acquired title to the
adjoining property, which it leased. The dam was reconstructed by
the tenant and others to a greater height than that permitted by the
agreement. Notice of this fact was given defendant. Plaintiff had
judgment below for $1,000.
1. Defendant was not responsible under the general rule for the
actions of its tenant.
2. Nor can a covenant of indemnity be implied from the dealings
of the parties.--Judgment reversed.
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BANKS AND BANKING-ACCEPTANCE OF DEPOSIT AFTER INSOL-
VENCY-H. E. Woolsey, Plaintiff in Error, vs. People of the State
of Colorado-No. 13659-Decided November 25, 1935--Opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Young.
FACTS: Defendant Woolsey was a director and cashier in active
charge of state bank. On October 20, 1931, a deposit was accepted
and on the same day the bank was closed as insolvent. Information
was filed charging defendant with a felony as director, officer, or em-
ployee of bank, in accepting deposits after knowledge that the bank was
insolvent and also charging larceny, following the form of information
used and approved under the Act of 1885i making such Act larceny as
well as a violation of Banking Act. Defendant pleads that information
is erroneous in that it charges two separate crimes and is ambiguous and
misleading.
HELD: Three points involved.
1. The information did include a charge of larceny which was
erroneous, but larceny charge was upon same facts as constituted viola-
tion of Sec. 2676, C. L. '21. Sufficient facts were alleged to make our
violation of Sec. 2676, therefore charge of larceny was mere surplusage
and not misleading.
2. Cashier's knowledge of status of affairs of bank, coupled with
his silence and failure to order deposits refused, and his knowledge that
until ordered to the contrary, deposits would be accepted, operated as
an asseiqt to acceptance of deposits. If he did not know, as cashier and
general manager, the status of affairs, he was guilty of criminal negli-
gence tantamount to acceptance.
3. Court will not hear or review errors to which objection was
not made at time of trial.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIMITATIONS OF ACTION-SALARY
AND COMPENSATION DISTINGUISHE--Pearl Morrow vs. Indus-
trial Commission of Colorado, et at.-No. 13815-Decided No-
vember 25, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Following an injury to plaintiff, the school district paid her for
seven months, or to the time of the expiration of the contract, her salary
of one hundred twenty-five dollars each month, out of which plaintiff
paid a substitute teacher, whom she employed, the sum of one hundred
dollars per month. She filed claim for compensation approximately
eight years after the date of her injury. The referee determined, as a
matter of law, that the claim was barred by Section 84 of the Work-
men's Compensation Act, being Section 4458, C. L. 1921, as amended
by Session Laws of 1923, Chapter 201, Section 15. Plaintiff con-
tended that the salary paid to her was a payment of compensation and,
as to her, removed the operation of the bar of the statute.
1. Plaintiff cannot rely upon salary payments made by the
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school district to excuse her delay of approximately eight years in pre-
senting her claim.
Mr. Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard, and Mr. Justice Bouck
dissent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATION OF HOURS OF LABOR--City
and County of Denver vs. Fred Schmid-No. 13729-Decided
November 25, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
City and County of Denver passed an ordinance in 1934 providing
that no barber shop shall be open on Sundays or. holidays or between
the hours of 6:00 p. m. and 8:00 a. m., from which prohibition
beauty parlors were expressly excluded. It was held invalid for the
following reasons:
1. That this ordinance is unreasonably arbitrary is self-evident.
It is not a limitation of hours of labor.
2. It does not apply to a particular trade or occupation because
it is common knowledge that much of the work of barber shops is also
performed in beauty parlors, which are expressly excepted.
3. It does not control a business for the benefit of the public.
4. It does not limit the business to when inspectors of State Bar-
bers are on duty for the reason they are not required by law to make
more than one inspection annually.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
DISBARMENT--JUDGE BEN B. LINDSEY REINSTATED--People, ex rel.
Colorado Bar Association, Petitioner, vs. Ben B. Lindsey, Re-
spondent-No. 12130-Decided November 25, 1935-Decision
en banc. Mr. Justice Campbell dissents.
AUTOMOBILES- CHATTEL MORTGAGE - DIRECTED VERDICT-The
Leeman Auto Company, a Colorado Corporation, vs. The
Swayne-Wimbush Motor Company-No. 13629-Decided No-
vember 25, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The Swayne-Wimbush Motor Company owned a Ford automo-
bile upon which The Leeman Auto Company held a chattel mortgage.
The Swayne-Wimbush Motor Company sued for damages, claiming
that the mortgagee wrongfully took possession of the car, failed to use
necessary care and diligence to secure a reasonable price, but sold the car
to the damage of the plaintiff. The case was tried to a jury, which
found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
HELD: The evidence sustains the verdict and plaintiff in error's
objections to certain instructions cannot be considered because such in-
structions were not inserted in the abstract of record.
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FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS-RIGHT TO SUE-Harriet E. Doll vs.
Broadway Moving and Storage Company-No. 13657-Decided
December 2, 1 9 3 5--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff in error, Anthony Doll and Company, a co-partnership,
the partners being residents of the city of New York, brought suit to
collect an account.
1. Section 2457, C. L. 1921, concerning the filing of a partner-
ship affidavit, does not apply to transactions in interstate commerce.
The statute is not applicable to a non-resident partnership having its
principal place of business outside the state and from which it transacted
business by means of salesmen or agents coming into this state.-Judg-
ment reversed.
COUNTY TREASURER-LIABILITY FOR DEPOSITS-Jesse R. Patterson,
et at. vs. The People, ex rel. Board of County Commissioners of
the County of Weld-Decided December 2, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Suit was brought by the people on relation of the Board of
County Commissioners of Weld County against one Patterson and
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company as surety on Patterson's
official bond as County Treasurer. January 1, 1933, when Patterson's
successor had qualified, Patterson delivered to him everything belonging
to the office with the exception of certain moneys represented by the
balance of deposits to the credit of Weld County, made by the said
treasurer with a New York banking house which had failed. For thirty
years or more it had been a custom of County Treasurers to carry an
account in New York for the payment of school bonds. Judgment was
given against Patterson and his surety for the balance of the deposits
with interest.
HELD: 1. The county had the right to maintain an action for
the recovery of the moneys.
2. The doctrine of strict and undivided responsibility of County
Treasurers for the safekeeping of tax funds coming into their hands does
not admit of the plea of estoppel.
3. That the county took steps in a bankruptcy proceeding to
make a claim on account of its loss did not permit delay in delivering
moneys to the treasurer's successor in office.
4. The Act of 1927, Session Laws, page 280, requiring County
Treasurers to deposit public funds in responsible banks located in the
State of Colorado, said to relax the rule of strict responsibility, is with-
out application because the loss was not of money in a bank in Colo-
rado.-Judgment affirmed.
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FORFEITURES-INSURANCE-Friedland vs. American Bankers Assoc.
-No. 13683-Decided December 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
Friedland had a health and accident policy which had a cash and
loan value if payments were regularly made for ten years, subject to
certain stipulated restrictions. Plaintiff made the payments to an au-
thorized agent for company whenever the agent called to collect the
same, which was not always on the due date, but at a later date; the
agent remitted the premium to the company, who accepted the same
without objection. Plaintiff paid nine years and three months, when
he received notice of cancellation from the company. Plaintiff claims he
has a right to the fixed surrender value and that defendants are estopped
from claiming delinquency in the payment of premiums.
HELD: The surrender value was and is a part of the consideration
for the continuous payment of premiums and the company cannot ca-
priciously nullify this right which it had extended and declare a for-
feiture.
"Where the privilege of cancellation is exercised under circum-
stances which would make it operate as a fraud on insured, it is invalid
and ineffective." Judgment should be for plaintiff for cash surindpr
value of policy.--udgment reversed.
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED AT SUPREME COURT LIBRARY
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, 1935. 7 vols.
Beale, Conflict of Laws, 1935. 3 vols.
Blashfield's Encyclopedia of Automobile Law, 1935. 10 vols.
Collier on Bankruptcy, 3rd Ed., 1935.
Glenn on Liquidation, 1935.
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 1935. 2 vols.
Parker's Corporation Manual, 1935.
Paul 1& Merton's Federal Income Tax, 1935. 6 vols.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., 1935. 3 vols.
Maloy, Nervous and Mental Diseases, 1935.
Shealer, Law of Government Contracts, 2nd Ed., 1935.
Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., 1935.
Jones on Bonds and Bond Securities, 4th Ed., 1935. 3 vols.
Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 2 vols., 1935.
Restatement of Law of Conflict of Laws, 1935.
A large number of books on various subjects, including law, have
been donated to this library by Joshua Grozier, Esq. Many of the law
books donated are out of print and valuable. They are:
Sanderson's Biography of the Signers of the Declaration of Independ-
ence.
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Official Report of the Universal Congress of Lawyers and Jurists, held
at St. Louis, Mo., 1904.
Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, by Win. L. Snyder.
Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the U. S. of America and
Other Powers, 1889.
The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 1850. 7 vols.
Barnes, Legislative Power in Canada, 1897.




Brief and Abstract Printing Solicited









Complete Abstracts of Title to All
Real Rtate in Denver. Arapahoo
and Adams Counties
MAIN 1206
725 18om St. Denver. Coi.
Phone KE. 0241
Prompt Service
WHEN YOU NEED
Books of Record
Minute Books
Stock Certificates
Loose Leaf Books
Office ,Supplies
Filing Equipment
Book Cases
Steel Shelving
Office Furniture
Picture Framing
COMPLETE
OFFICE OUTFITTERS
Denver
